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Several years ago in a lecture at Suffolk University Law School, I spoke
about libel law in the United States as having become, in default of the
creation of more suitable remedies, a means of securing media accounta-
bility. I also discussed the role of punitive damages in particular as an
enabler. Punitive damages enabled individuals believing themselves to have
been wronged by the media to do battle with the media. In such circum-
stances, I suggested that punitive damages serve as an equalizer.' Megav-
erdicts become the remedy for injury that megamedia inflicts. In my previous
essay I was chiefly concerned with the merits of a right of reply statute as
an alternative to damages in defamation cases. I did not then develop the
special role that punitive damages have assumed in recent years in libel
cases-the role of first amendment equalizer. I shall attempt to do that
now.
Punitive damages in defamation cases continue to be a subject of
criticism in the law reviews.2 Yet mysteriously such damages survive. Their
domain, much diminished by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,3 was surprisingly
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law
Center.
I wish to thank my colleague Tom Dienes for many helpful suggestions and criticisms on
this essay. Although I was not able to persuade him of the merits of a first amendment case
for punitive damages, he was able to persuade me of a number of important issues that
merited thought and consideration in this area.
1. See Barron, The Search For Media Accountability, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 789, 792
(1985). The article was based on the Seventeenth Donahue Lecture, delivered at Suffolk
University Law School on October 24, 1985.
2. See Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery From the Press-An
Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solution", 25 Wam. & MARY L. Rv. 793, 804-09
(1984) (for extremely critical discussion of role of punitive damages in libel cases). Professor
Van Alstyne suggests a variety of procedural changes in the manner libel cases involving
punitive damages are tried. These include using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of
proof or applying "the procedural safeguards of a criminal libel trial." Id. at 806-07. Conceding
the further complexing these proposals portend for the already complex law of libel, Professor
Van Alstyne concludes: "Still, rather than move to these very vexing notions, it may be better
to discontinue punitive damages in civil libel cases completely." Id. at 807. See also Comment,
Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 847 (1985). This Comment does not
advocate the abolition of punitive damages in libel cases but would make them more difficult
to obtain by requiring public figures "to prove common law malice as well as actual malice
before they can collect punitive damages for libel." Id. at 862.
3. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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enlarged once again only four years ago in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
4
Even more recently, the issue of the constitutionality of punitive damages
vel non has occupied center stage on the legal scene as a result of the
Supreme Court decision in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco.5 As is
well known by now, Justice Blackmun in Browning-Ferris declined to disturb
"the jury's punitive damages award."'6 The jury verdict awarded the defen-
dant $51,146 in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.
7
The enormous punitive damages recovery left undisturbed in Browning-
Ferris was preceded by the Court's refusal a year earlier in Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw8 to disturb a punitive damages award for $1.6
million. The recoveries left secure in these two cases wrould on their face
appear to suggest that punitive damages will continue to have an important
place in American law. Nonetheless, commentators have suggested that the
long-term implication of Browning-Ferris is that punitive damages may yet
be held subject to constitutional review. Torts expert Professor Gary Schwartz
writes:
After Browning-Ferris, we know that two of the Court's jus-
tices-Justices O'Connor and Stevens-believe that excessive puni-
tive damages violate the Excessive Fines Clause; in addition, two
other justices-Justices Brennan and Marshall-evidently believe
that grossly excessive punitive damages can violate the Due Process
Clause. This adds up to four votes on behalf of the idea that the
Constitution does place substantive limits on the size of punitive
damages awards. 9
Professor Schwartz believes it a reasonable prediction that at least one
of the five justices10 who have not yet declared themselves on the consti-
tutional reviewability of punitive damages "will, in some appropriate future
case, affiliate" with the Brennan position that punitive damages are subject
to review under a substantive due process analysis." Professor Schwartz
concedes that the refusal of these five to join Justice O'Connor's "plausible"
position in Browning-Ferris2 contradicts his position. Justice O'Connor, of
course, contends contrary to the Court majority that the Excessive Fines
Clause of the eighth amendment does extend to punitive damage awards in
4. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
5. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
6. Id. at 2923.
7. Id. at 2913.
8. 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988).
9. See Schwartz, Browning-Ferris: The Supreme Court's Emerging Majorities, 40 ALA.
L. REv. 1237, 1248 (1989).
10. The five Justices are White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy. Schwartz,
supra note 9, at 1248.
11. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1249.
12. Id. at 1249 n.51.
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a suit between private parties. 13 The refusal of the five Justices, who have
not declared themselves on the constitutional reviewability of punitive dam-
ages, to rally to this view, Professor Schwartz suggests, may demonstrate
"an underlying prudential pieference to avoid the constitutionalization of
punitive damages."'
4
PuNrrivE DAMAGES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT-A CMILLING EFFECT?
Neither Bankers Life nor Browning-Ferris raised or discussed punitive
damages in a first amendment defamation context. Is the first amendment
status of punitive damages a special case? In the brief filed by Floyd Abrams
and his colleagues with the Ninth Circuit in Newton v. NBC-a case where
after remittitur the court entered judgment for $5,000,000 in punitive
damages-the first amendment stand against punitive damages is stated with
economy and clarity:
Exposing the press to massive and unpredictable awards of
punitive damages will inevitably chill the vigor of reporting on
important public issues. When huge punitive awards are rendered
by juries that routinely function without standards or guidelines the
risks of injustice are grave enough; when juries render their awards
in the context of First Amendment-protected activities, the risks of
injustice in public figure libel cases should be held unconstitutional.' 5
The contention is that given the lack of any limitation on their outer
limits, punitive damages chill free expression. This proposition is the heart
of the first amendment assault on punitive damages. It is not a new assault.
In 1989, a report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
declared:
Significant constitutional considerations suggest that there should
be no role for punitive damage awards under our system of free
expression-not even the deterrence or punishment of knowingly or
recklessly false speech.16
What were the constitutional considerations that suggest precluding
punitive damage awards under our system of free expression? The uncer-
13. See Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Kelco, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2924 (1989).
14. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1249 n.51. Professor Schwartz also adds that his "pre-
diction" is based on the assumption of no change of membership on the Court. Id. at 1249
n.52.
15. Brief of Appellants, Carson Wayne Newton, a/k/a Wayne Newton, Plaintiff-Appellee
v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Brian Elliot Ross, Ira
Silverman, and Paul Greenberg, Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central
District of California (No. CV-88-05848 MDC (JRx)). See Newton v. NBC, 677 F. Supp. 1066
(D.C. Nev. 1987).
16. See Report of the Committee on Communications Law on Punitive Damages in Libel
Actions, 42 Rec. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 20, 21 (1987) [hereinafter
Report].
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tainties associated with punitive damages created "a risk of self-censorship."
Could this be proved? No, it could not be proved. But it was "likely" that
this risk was the case:
It is difficult to marshal empirical evidence as to the 'chilling'
effect of the prospect of six-, seven- and eight-figure damage awards,
with significant punitive damage components. Yet, these awards
undoubtedly do not go unnoticed in newsrooms and editorial offices.
Although libel defendants have often succeeded in overturning jury
awards of punitive damages, the costs of even successful defenses
of libel actions-which we believe are increased substantially by the
prospect of large punitive awards-can be significant, and even
ruinous for smaller media entities and individuals. It is likely that
the desire of the media, in particular, to avoid such costs itself
deters protected speech.
17
The foregoing is hardly a devastating position for the argument that
punitive damages in defamation cases chill free expression. The point is
that it is probably difficult to make a devastating case either way. As
Professor Sunstein has observed in the context of a slightly different New
York Times v. SullivanS-type issue: "Arguments about chilling effect operate
at too high a level of generality to solve the particular question. In the
abstract, they threaten to do away entirely with the tort of defamation, and
no one seems to want to go that far.' ' 9
There is more to say about the chilling effect dimension of the punitive
damages issue than that it is unprovable. One way of deflecting the chilling
effect argument has been to say that since punitive damages are awarded
only when actual malice has been proved, the speech that is inhibited is by
definition speech which has been ruled to be unprotected expression. The
Ninth Circuit took this approach in Maheu v. Hughes Tooleo. 20 In Maheu,
Judge Duniway conceded that the United States Supreme Court had "shown
a dislike for the use of punitive damages in cases involving First Amendment
rights," but he declared that the Court had left open the question whether
punitive damages "can be awarded in situations in which the high and
protective standard of actual malice has been met."' 21 The Ninth Circuit in
Maheu then examined a number of federal appellate decisions. The tenor
of these decisions is illustrated by the approving summary in Maheu of
Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc. on the question of the first amend-
ment validity of punitive damages where actual malice has been shown."
Maheu summarized Appleyard as follows:
17. Id. at 22.
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. See Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 891, 896 (1984).
20. 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977).
21. Maheu v. Hughes Toolco, 569 F.2d 459, 478 (9th Cir. 1977).
22. 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
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Finally, in Appleyard, ... the Fourth Circuit specifically re-
fused to follow the district court's opinion in this case and concluded
that the prevention of any chilling effect had little application where
New York Times malice had been shown.
In such a situation, "there is no good-faith attempt to point
out real abuses to the public," rather "[t]here is only an unsub-
stantiated attack on the character, reputation and good name of a
particular individual.
' 23
Relying on Appleyard and other cases, the Ninth Circuit in Maheu
concluded that "punitive damages are permissible once actual malice as
defined in New York Times has been established."24 One way to avoid the
first amendment, or more specifically, the "chilling effect" issue presented
by awards of punitive damages in libel cases is to deny its application in
cases where actual malice has been shown. This mode of avoiding the first
amendment issue continues to persist in the caselaw. Thus, in Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. CBS, Inc. ,21 where the court upheld $2,000,000
in punitive damages against CBS, the Seventh Circuit observed:
[W]e are forced to conclude that this case does not involve
freedom of the press. Rather, it is one in which there is clear and
convincing evidence that a local television journalist acted with
actual malice when he made false statements about Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corporation. Because false statements of fact made
with actual malice are not protected by the First Amendment, this
court is required to affirm the district court's finding that Jacobson
and CBS libeled Brown & Williamson.26
Given the vast wealth of a media defendant like CBS, and the proven
injury, the punitive damages did not seem excessive to the Seventh Circuit
in Brown & Williamson. Yet given the magnitude of the punitive damage
award in Brown & Williamson, the failure of the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in that case is puzzling. Perhaps the Court was not prepared to
consider the first amendment invalidity of punitive damages where the media
defendant clearly acted with actual malice.
The Supreme Court has used a similar approach to respond to first
amendment arguments made with regard to other categories of defamatory
speech. In Dun & Bradstreet27 Justice Powell justified the Court's refusal
to reverse an award of punitive damages by a Vermont jury. The reason?
The plaintiff was a private figure and the defamation did not involve a
matter of public concern. Justice Powell observed: "We have long recog-
23. Maheu, 569 F.2d at 479.
24. Id. at 480.
25. 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987).
26. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 827 F.2d 1119, 1143 (7th Cir.
1987).
27. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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nized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. '" 28 Speech
on "matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern." 29
The foregoing cases respond to the chilling effect or first amendment
argument against punitive damages in libel cases in an entirely unsatisfactory
way because the response is tautological. Expression is unprotected expres-
sion only because a court ultimately holds it so. (The same may be said of
the question of who is a private figure or what constitutes private as
compared with public speech.) False statements of fact made with actual
malice is hardly a discrete, easily identifiable, and unmistakable category
of speech. Indeed, trial courts and appellate courts frequently disagree as
to whether or not false statements of fact were published with actual malice.
False statements of fact published with actual malice is a far less discrete
category of speech than "obscenity" for example, and the parameters of
the category of expression are not always clear.
The journalist must publish before the fact-before a court has deter-
mined whether a false statement of fact was made with actual malice. Thus,
at the most critical time as far as the journalist is concerned-the time of
publication-the chilling effect, if one exists, is hardly minimized by the
fact that ultimately a court concludes that the defamation at issue was
published with actual malice.
ANOTHER SIDE OF THE CEnLING EFFECT ISSUE
Having discussed one point of view concerning the chilling effect of
punitive damages in libel cases, I wish to stake out another position in the
continuing debate. Usually, discussions about chilling effect of punitive
damages in libel cases assume that the chill is always on the media speaker.
But the increasing unavailability to the public person, whether public official
or public figure, of successful recourse to the libel law works a chill of its
own, and it is against this background that the continued efficacy of punitive
damages in libel litigation should be considered.
Has the libel regime ushered in by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
worked to the disadvantage of American public life? Has it driven out, or
more important, inhibited from entering public life all but the hardened
and tough-skinned? It is not possible to number those, however talented
and public-spirited, who choose not to withstand the pitiless, constant, and
often scurrilous scrutiny that is today the lot of those who participate in
American public life. The transformation of American libel law in favor of
the media defendant may not have depopulated public life of the wise, the
virtuous, and alas, the sensitive, but to paraphrase Professor Sunstein, there
is no assurance that it has not either. Certainly the evisceration of state
libel law accomplished by Gertz may have had some impact on those who
choose to enter public life. As Gertz made abundantly clear, those who
28. Id. at 758.
29. Id. at 759. See also id. at 757 n.4.
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advisedly choose to enter public life waive many of the traditional protec-
tions of state libel law.
From a historical perspective, it is good to contrast this with an earlier
period in American history. Libel historian Norman Rosenberg writes that
in the nineteenth century the chilling effect on the press of punitive damages
and the libel law generally was well understood, but the connection between
freeing the press from a chilling effect only to cast an equivalent chill on
public life seems to have been better understood then than now. Thus
Professor Rosenberg writes with respect to the reaction in the late nineteenth
century to the chilling effect of the libel laws:
The chilling effect of libel laws was not a discovery of twentieth-
century judges and First Amendment scholars; nineteenth-century
commentators recognized that tough defamation laws encouraged
self-censorship, and greater self-censorship was precisely what most
late nineteenth-century lawmakers wanted, especially in libels in-
volving the reputations of the best men. 30
Professor Rosenberg said that in the late nineteenth century attention
was directed to discouraging libelous falsehoods rather than to encouraging
vigorous and robust public debate in the New York Times sense. Reformers,
he writes, "sought to rationalize and professionalize public affairs." 3 This
reformation effort "demanded that irresponsible newspaper stories not
mislead voters into rejecting re-form candidates or losing confidence in
capable public officials." 32 Indeed, leaders of the bar in that era were
instrumental in staving off efforts by state legislatures to prohibit punitive
damages.
Viewed from this vantage point, the role of punitive damages reduces
the chill on public debate and public persons that the Times-Gertz doctrines
may have cast on public life. People may believe that if they enter public
life or public debate they themselves will be open to attack. The decision
to enter public life in such circumstances is akin to the decision that the
criminal defendant must consider in pondering whether to testify at trial.
Entering the vortex opens one's whole life to impeachment by the media,
and that opening is without recourse. It is increasingly a fact of life for the
public person that the libel law can rarely be relied on to rescue those who
are technically defamed. The surprising survival in such a legal climate of
punitive damages may serve to even out things. The survival of punitive
damages in libel cases suggests that the public person is not totally without
recourse to false and baseless attacks. Barry Goldwater's punitive damage
recovery against media defendant Ralph Ginzburg-rare as it is-is illustra-
tive.
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EQUALIZING Tm OPINION PROCESS AND PUNITVE DAMAGES
At least from the media perspective, one aspect of the assault on
punitive damages in defamation cases merits some re-examination. This
aspect is the idea that the first amendment significance of the punitive
damages issue is found only on the media defamation defendant's side of
the line. As the report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York states, the "dramatic increase" in punitive damage awards in libel
cases is "unwarranted in terms of any countervailing interests in preserving
individual reputation.
'3
Let us explore this no-countervailing-interest argument by asking a
heretical question: is there a first amendment function to the award of
punitive damages in libel cases from the plaintiffs point of view? My
answer to this question is yes. In my view, the present campaign against
punitive damages in libel cases is attributable precisely to the fact that these
damages do in fact serve countervailing interests. These cou'ntervailing
interests include not only the preservation of reputation but the equalization
of the opinion process as well. The potential of punitive damages, no matter
how ultimately unrealized, gives heart and strength to the non-media speaker
in the opinion process. I believe that this proposition is evident on the face
of the report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which
charged that no countervailing interest is served by punitive damages. Thus,
the report states that large 'punitive damage recoveries deter settlement,
encourage "the bringing of libel suits, whatever their merits," and obliges
the news media to devote "substantial resources to the defense of even
tenuous actions." The response to all this, of course, is-exactly right.
Punitive damages in their very standardlessness and the random possi-
bility they present of a big win encourage those attacked or criticized by
the media to undertake litigation against the media. Winning and keeping
a punitive damage judgment in a libel case is as unlikely and yet as alluring
as winning the state lottery. Punitive damages encourage legal battles with
the media that otherwise might not occur. Punitive damages are used as an
awkward but nonetheless powerful means of coping with the fine-tuned
complexities of the Times-Gertz rules. These rules constitute a minefield for
the plaintiff's libel lawyer, and it is a rare libel plaintiff who survives a
walk through that field. The remedy that prompts the brave among them
to try is punitive damages. Understood from this perspective, the present
campaign against the first amendment validity of punitive damages makes
sense. Punitive damages are virtually the last weapon left to the libel
plaintiff.
Viewing the use of punitive damages by a libel plaintiff from a first
amendment perspective, two first amendment functions can be served. First,
punitive damages encourage speech by non-media speakers who might
otherwise remain silent. Since occasionally a libel plaintiff does win and
33. Report, supra note 16, at 20.
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keep a punitive damage award in a libel case, the public person is embold-
ened to speak despite the threat of media attacks operating behind the
shelter of actual malice. Second, the scale of punitive damages may provide
precious entry into the opinion process. Libel litigation thus itself becomes
a forum. The sheer size of the damages sought and the possibility, however
slight, that they may be won are used to communicate the ideas of the libel
plaintiff. Paradoxically, punitive damages can thus play a first amendment
function in opening up a debate which otherwise might not take place.
Punitive damages may attract media attention for the ideas of the libel
plaintiff that otherwise might not be obtainable.
It is understandable that punitive damages are anathema in the media.
But this arena is not the only area where punitive damages are friendless.
It is my observation that punitive damages in defamation cases have very
few well-wishers in academe. Mention of punitive damages here as elsewhere
evokes inevitable concerns about "chilling effect" and "self-censorship.
' ' 4
Yet it is particularly among legal academics that one would hope the present
function of punitive damages in contemporary libel litigation would be
understood. Simply stated, punitive damages-at least for a moment-make
the weak strong and give a voice to the silent. The potential size of the
punitive damage remedy serves to accomplish at least a modicum of media
accountability.
The punitive damage claim is well understood to be a longshot by all
who assert it. But some longshots do come through. Barry Goldwater and
Elmer Gertz can give memorable testimony to that. In these famous cases
plaintiffs won substantial punitive damages despite the formidable strictures
of the Times doctrine. Yet it is interesting that these cases do not discuss
the now so current issue of whether the first amendment should be read to
prohibit or limit problems with the award of punitive damages in libel cases.
In Goldwater v. Ginzburg,as Barry Goldwater, an elected public official
running for the Presidency, the nation's highest elective office, won a total
of $75,000 in punitive damages against a media defendant despite the new
hurdles imposed by the Times doctrine decided five years earlier."6 As a
34. I do not mean to suggest that these concerns about "chilling effect" are baseless. I
argue only that the "actual malice privilege" has a "chilling effect" as well. The cold wind
blowing from punitive damages on media expression should be evaluated in terms of the cold
wind blowing from the "actual malice" privilege on individual expression. Professor Van
Alstyne made a strong defense of the "chilling effect" of punitive damages on the media in
libel cases. In addition, he argues that the available legal means for correcting injustices in
the awards of punitive damages are inadequate: "Remittitur is thus almost always an insufficient
response. Indeed, the chilling effect on publishers who have reason to be apprehensive of
being caught by the jury, policed only by the discretion of judges to reduce damages in such
measure as the judges then think appropriate, is still intolerable. For all that one can know,
the judges may themselves still sustain very sizeable punitive damages awards reflecting in part
their own understandable, but constitutionally improper, distaste for the defendant's publica-
tion." See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 808.
35. 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
36. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 342-43 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1049 (1970).
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consequence of the litigation that ensued on remand from the Supreme
Court decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,'37 Welch received $100,000
compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. 38 Here again the
court of appeals did not discuss the first amendment problems presented
by punitive damage awards in libel litigation. The court of appeals was
concerned about the injury to Gertz's reputation and the unmistakable proof
of actual malice:
In summary, Stanley [a writer for the media defendant] con-
ceived of a story line; solicited Stang, a writer with a known and
unreasonable propensity to libel persons or organizations as Com-
munist, to write the article; and after the article was submitted,
made virtually no effort to check the validity of statements that
were defamatory per se of Gertz, and in fact added further defam-
atory material based on Stang's 'facts.' There was more than enough
evidence for the jury to conclude that this article was published
with utter disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements
contained in the article about Gertz. "Freedom of the press under
the First Amendment does not include absolute license to destroy
lives or careers." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967) ... (Warren, C.J., concurring).39
This article really has two themes. The first is that punitive damages in
a limited way perform an equalizing role in the contemporary opinion
process. Because punitive damages enhance the size of the ad damnum,
they attract media attention, and therefore, grant access to the libel plaintiff
who in fact may be bringing suit not in pursuit of damages but merely in
hopes of securing some coverage for his side of the story. In a sense, then,
punitive damages provide a way of entering the opinion process for the
libel plaintiff. As we all know, in the main libel plaintiffs lose. If they win
at trial, the great majority lose on appeal. As a rule, libel plaintiffs do not
win-much less win punitive damages. The second theme of this article is
that the punitive damages issue in libel litigation cannot be treated in
isolation.
CONSmDERNG PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CONTEXT
If the status of punitive damages in libel litigation merits reform, such
reform must be considered in context. Reform must be considered in terms
of a reform of the whole of libel law, particularly the public law of libel
created by Times and Gertz. A reform of present day libel law that only
abolishes or severely limits punitive damages will exacerbate the underlying
sense of grievance against the media, which prompts the large claims and
verdicts for punitive damages that are the source of so much anxiety.
37. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
38. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982).
39. Id. at 539.
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Two pervasive feelings within society feed this sense of grievance. The
first feeling is that the contest between the press and its quarry is inherently
unequal. The second feeling is that the resources of the media giant can
too easily overwhelm the person who chooses to fight. These feelings animate
juries as well as others. Thus it is that in twentieth century America we
experience the obverse of the pattern in eighteenth century America. The
jury is now sometimes seen not as the editor's friend but as his foe. The
jury is often viewed by the media defendant not as a rescuer but as an
enemy. These reactions will only intensify if the present tendency of the
libel law to favor the media defendant above all others is continued to the
point of depriving the libel plaintiff of even the possibility of a remedy in
punitive damages. The battle terrain will merely shift from punitive damages
to actual damages.
There is now considerable literature on ways to reform the libel law.
Proposals such as vindication statutes and right of reply alternatives to
actions for defamation damages have been made with increasing frequency.
40
These proposals have failed to win acceptance. Until they do, a flat
prohibition on punitive damages is not reasonable. The balance struck in
Sullivan between free press and reputation has been refined now to the
point that it is weighted far more heavily in favor of the media defendant
than was the case at its inception.
The role of punitive damages in libel cases has become a major source
of controversy. In a sense, punitive damages are one of the last pieces of
heavy artillery left in the dwindling arsenal of the libel plaintiff. The media-
oriented Report of the Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington
Program [hereinafter Annenberg Report] proposed a comprehensive Libel
Reform Act. Section 9(d) of the proposed Act states: "No punitive damages
shall be permitted in any action for defamation." The explanation the report
provides for its proposed abolition of punitive damages concisely states
most of the reasons found in the literature and the caselaw against punitive
damages in libel cases:
Punitive damages act as an excessive chill on free expression
and may be devastating to the defendant. In addition, such awards
bear no relation to reality, sometimes serving to vent distaste for
the nature or character of the defendant instead of fulfilling any
rational interest in deterrence. Compensatory damages for defa-
mation are already highly subjective and may even contain a hidden
punitive component. To permit additional punitive damages, there-
40. See, e.g., Hulme, Vindicating Reputation: An Alternative to Damages As a Remedy
for Defamation, 30 AM. U.L. Rsv. 375 (1981); Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A
Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1983); Le Bel, Defamation and
the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 779 (1984); Barron,
supra note 1; Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative To Current Libel Law, 74 CALF.
L. REv. 809 (1986); Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan In Its Proper
Place, 101 H. v. L. Rnv. 1287 (1988).
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fore, may punish the defendant twice and provide the plaintiff with
a windfall grossly out of proportion to actual injury.
41
The windfall aspect of punitive damages and their chilling effect on
free expression are familiar criticisms. Interestingly enough, these concerns
do not disappear even if punitive damages are abolished. The mental distress
element of actual damages can support a libel action even if there is no
provable reputational harm, inviting the possible award of what are essen-
tially punitive damages under the guise of actual damages. 42 Consequently,
even if punitive damages are abolished, the "chilling effect" problem so
worrisome to the media defamation defendant still endures.
An additional criticism the Annenberg Report offers against punitive
damages is their lack of proportionality, i.e., the damages are not propor-
tional to the injury suffered. Yet the Annenberg Project's response to this
purported proportionality problem is to mirror the very defect the Project
criticizes. Instead of proposing that punitive damages be proportional to
the injury suffered, the Annenberg Libel Reform Act proposes that punitive
damages be abolished altogether.
The law on punitive damages in libel cases should not be changed either
as a matter of constitutional interpretation or through legislation until the
libel law as a whole is overhauled. Virtually every revision among all the
numerous revisions of the libel law that have occurred since the development
of the Sullivan doctrine has changed the law at the expense of the libel
plaintiff and for the benefit of the libel defendant, particularly the media
libel defendant. It is an anomaly that the army of media lawyers and the
academic chorus that surrounds them with a constant first amendment
benediction does not perceive any relationship between the transformation
of American law in favor of the libel defendant and the resort to punitive
damages by libel plaintiffs. The juries, however, understand this relationship.
The rise of the megaverdict is a desperate effort to achieve a balance
of power in the libel wars. The ability of libel plaintiffs in a few rare cases
to obtain punitive damages is the last redoubt left. In 1985 Justice White,
concurring in Dun & Bradstreet, wrote a biting critique of the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan doctrine declaring that he had become convinced that
the Court had "struck an improvident balance in the New York Times case
between the public's interest in being fully informed about public officials
and public affairs and the competing interest of those who have been
defamed in vindicating their reputation.
'4
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43. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985).
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In the course of that discussion, Justice White set forth some of the
hurdles that the public official libel plaintiff, bound by the New York
Times-Gertz rules, encounters. The public figure plaintiff faces these hurdles
as well. A public official plaintiff is not able to recover in defamation if
he proves falsity despite the fact that the Supreme Court has said there is
no first amendment value in a false statement of fact. Justice White
summarizes the situation as follows:
Yet in New York Times cases, the public official's complaint
will be dismissed unless he alleges and makes out a jury case of a
knowing or reckless falsehood. Absent such proof, there will be no
jury verdict or judgment of any kind in his favor, even if the
challenged publication is admittedly false. The lie will stand, and
the public continue to be misinformed about public matters ...
Even if the plaintiff sues, he frequently loses on summary judgment
or never gets to the jury because of insufficient proof of malice.
... Furthermore, when the plaintiff loses, the jury will likely return
a general verdict and there will be no judgment that the publication
was false, even though it was without foundation in reality. (Em-.
phasis supplied.) 44
Elsewhere in his concurrence in Dun & Bradstreet Justice White observed
that the abolition of punitive damages might have been preferable to the
rules of the Times doctrine:
In New York Times, instead of escalating the plaintiff's burden
of proof to an almost impossible level, we could have achieved our
stated goal by limiting the recoverable damages to a level that would
not unduly threaten the press. Punitive damages might have been
scrutinized as Justice Harlan suggested in Rosenbloom, or perhaps
even entirely forbidden.
4 5
The Libel Defense Resource Center (hereafter LDRC) has observed that
"of the 19 Justices who have sat on the Court since Sullivan ... fully 16
have either written opinions stating ... concerns [about punitive damages
in libel actions] (9 Justices) and/or have joined in those opinions (7
Justices)."4 The LDRC Bulletin noted that "even Justice White" suggested
in his concurrence in Dun & Bradstreet that a prohibition of punitive
damages in libel cases might be preferable to the New York Times actual
malice test now in force. 47 White is quoted in the context of an analysis of
whether the current Justices on the Court would support a first amendment
based prohibition on punitive damages in libel actions. The point of White's
44. Id. at 767-68.
45. Id. at 771.
46. LDRC Status Report and Roundtable Discussion, Punitive Damages in Libel Actions,
24 LDRC Bulletin 5 (1988).
47. Id.
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remarks, however, was not that punitive damages should be prohibited in
vacuo, but that this prohibition should be substituted for the present
complexities of the Times-Gertz rules-weighted as they are against the
public plaintiff.
Justice White's views on punitive damages in Dun & Bradstreet are part
of a critique of the Times-Gertz doctrines in their entirety, but the full
implications of this critique are rarely highlighted. Thus, libel lawyers
Marshall Nelson and Camron deVore in an essay on the constitutional
invalidity of punitive damages in libel cases described Justice White's
position as a suggestion that "presumed and punitive damages might be
prohibited altogether as an alternative means of constitutional protection in
lieu of the New York Times rule."
' 48
Justice White's views on punitive damages in the defamation context
should be viewed against the background of the remarks he made about
punitive damages in his Gertz dissent.49 In Gertz he did not protest the
award of punitive damages in defamation cases, but instead Justice White
protested the majority's new rule that actual malice should be required for
the award of punitive damages:
The Court again complains about substantial verdicts and the
possibility of press self-censorship, saying that punitive damages are
merely 'private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible
conduct and to deter its future occurrence.' But I see no constitu-
tional difference between publishing with reckless disregard for the
truth, where punitive damages will be permitted, and negligent
publication where they will not be allowed. 0
Justice White believed that negligence no less than actual malice could
be a basis for the award of punitive damages. Indeed, one consequence of
Dun & Bradstreet, in which Justice White concurred, was to restore part
of the pre-Gertz law. After Dun & Bradstreet, a private plaintiff in a matter
not of public concern can recover general and punitive damages without
proving actual malice. Indeed, that was the fact pattern of Dun & Bradstreet
itself. Justice White was pleased to see Gertz narrowed. But he said it was
news to him that Gertz was intended to apply only to the private defamation
plaintiff when the defamation involved matters of public concern.
In his dissent in Gertz, Justice White made some observations in defense
of punitive damages. He addressed himself to what today would be called
the lack of proportionality argument-the contention that punitive damage
awards by juries bear no relationship to the actual harm suffered by the
libel plaintiff. Justice White denied there was empirical evidence to sub-
stantiate this charge.
Furthermore, Justice White pointed to various features of state law that
helped to minimize and limit punitive damages. These state law character-
48. Id. at 34.
49. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 395 (1974).
50. Id. at 396.
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istics included the requirement by a number of courts that punitive damages
bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damage awards, state re-
traction laws that allow a retraction to mitigate punitive damages, and the
salutary features of the motion for new trial and the appeal to grapple with
excessive awards of punitive damages. He concluded his defense of the pre-
Gertz state law rules on punitive damages by saying: "For almost 200 years,
punitive damages and the First Amendment have peacefully coexisted."
5'
This last point deserves explication. For most of that 200 years the libel
law and the first amendment operated on separate planes; the first amend-
ment did not operate to limit the application of the traditional common-
law rules of libel. Today, of course, the first amendment affects libel law,
and the role of punitive damages as an equipoise is more important than
before.
Past and present history notwithstanding, calls for the prohibition by
the Supreme Court of punitive damages on first amendment grounds con-
tinue. Libel lawyers Nelson and deVore assert that the "stage is now set"
for the Court "to further restrict or even prohibit the award of punitive
damages in the context of a public official/figure libel suit involving issues
of public concern.'" 2
SHOULD THE Times-Gertz RULES BE EXCHANGED FOR THE ABOLITION OF
PuNivE DAMAGES?
It is contended that in these Times-Gertz type libel cases the first
amendment interest in debate is at its height and the state "interest in
providing any recovery beyond compensation for actual provable injury is
at its weakest. ' 53 In short, keep the Times rules and scuttle punitive damages.
This option is precisely the alternative that should be rejected. A fairer
alternative would be to set aside the present Times-Gertz rules which work
so greatly to the disadvantage of the public plaintiff and in exchange abolish
punitive damages.
The real question is-are there any media takers for this offer? I think
not. And understandably so. The present Times-Gertz rules have very nearly
extinguished the libel suit as a meaningful remedy for all but the most well-
heeled and indefatigable libel plaintiffs. As a result, more would be lost
than gained by accepting this choice. To some extent the present functioning
of the actual malice privilege does have some desirable consequences. It
encourages vigorous journalism since the actual malice privilege protects
most responsible media from the consequences of inadvertent error-error
which otherwise might be too easily labeled negligent by juries.
There appears to be no easy exit from the present situation in American
libel law. From the point of view of the libel plaintiff-and non-media
speakers generally-the actual malice privilege is overly protective of the
51. Id. at 398.
52. Punitive Damages in Libel Actions, supra note 46, at 35.
53. Id.
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media defendant. From the perspective of the media defendant, punitive
damages are too random and powerful a remedy.
Presently, there is a concerted effort to add punitive damages to the
rubble heap of state law libel remedies that have been tossed aside in the
name of Sullivan and Gertz. Yet the imbalance in our communications
process will only be exacerbated if the present Times-Gertz rules with their
gross unfairness to the public person plaintiff are retained but punitive
damages are abolished. Too often abolition of punitive damages in libel
actions is discussed in isolation, without consideration of the impact that
removal of punitive damages would have on the fragile remnant of the libel
law now available to a beleaguered libel plaintiff bent on defending his
reputation.
The constitutionaization of the libel law has resulted in a legal obstacle
course for the libel plaintiff. These obstacles affect not only the public
official libel plaintiff but public figures as well. Illustrative is Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc. 4 decided in the same year as Dun & Bradstreet. In
Anderson the Supreme Court held that in a New York Times libel case the
judge in the summary judgment proceeding should consider whether the
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the plaintiff had shown actual
malice with "convincing clarity." ' '" The plaintiff in Anderson was a public
figure, and interestingly enough, Justice White wrote the opinion for the
Court.
The ravaging effect of the Times-Gertz libel rules on state law has, of
course, spread far beyond situations involving the public plaintiff. In
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,5 the Court struck down the
application of a Pennsylvania statute which followed the common-law rule
and placed the burden of proving falsity in a defamation case on the
defendant. In Hepps, a private plaintiff sought damages for defamation
against a media defendant in a matter of public concern. In such circum-
stances, the first amendment required that the burden of proving falsity
should be on the plaintiff.
In Hepps Justice O'Connor accurately spoke about two forces that were
"reshap[ing] the common-law landscape to conform to the First Amend-
ment. ' 's 7 These two forces were centered around whether the plaintiff was
a public person and whether the speech at issue was a matter of public
concern. The first amendment impact on the common-law landscape was
more invasive in the former case than the latter, but it cut a wide swath in
the latter area as well. In dissent, Justice Stevens forcefully protested the
result in Hepps: "By attaching no weight to the State's interest in protecting
the private individual's good name, the Court has reached a pernicious
result.''38 He then quoted from Justice Stewart's concurrence in Rosenblatt
54. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
55. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
56. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
57. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).
58. Id. at 781.
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v. Baer:59 " 'The First and Fourteenth Amendments have not stripped private
citizens of all means of redress for injuries inflicted upon them by careless
liars.... Yet, imperfect though it is, an action for damages is the only
hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose reputation
has been falsely dishonored.' "6
The foregoing remarks of Justice Stewart were uttered nearly a quarter
of a century ago. Since that time, as we have seen, the common-law libel
landscape has been transformed in the name of the first amendment. It is
perhaps more difficult now for a libel judgment in favor of the plaintiff to
survive appellate review than it has ever been in American history. Is it any
wonder in such circumstances that the latitude that punitive damages the-
oretically afford the libel plaintiff is resorted to more dramatically than in
the past?
CONCLUSION
The argument that the first amendment itself should be read to prohibit
punitive damages is certainly not a new one. Yet the issue has often evaded
judicial scrutiny in precisely the situations where one would most often
expect to find it. Thus in Brown & Williamson61 the court considered and
rejected an eighth amendment challenge to the punitive damages award:
"Even if we were to accept the defendants' argument that the excessive
fines clause applies to civil proceedings, we conclude that the punitive
damages award in this case is not excessive." ' 62 The Court did not consider,
however, or discuss whether a $2,000,000 punitive damage award raised or
implicated any first amendment issues. Brown & Williamson upheld on
appeal a total damage award of $3,050,000: $2,000,000 in punitive damages
against CBS, $1,000,000 in presumed damages against CBS, and $50,000
against the reporter.
The concept of proportionality is very much in evidence in the contro-
versy about how our law should treat punitive damages in Times-type libel
cases. Usually, proportionality means that the punitive damages awarded
should be approximately proportional to the compensatory damages awarded.
Brown & Williamson did not discuss proportionality; the case used a two-
pronged inquiry to determine if the punitive damages were excessive: (1)
Were the punitive damages excessive in relation to the attorney's fees
incurred by the plaintiff? (2) What relation did the punitive damages bear
to the defendants' wealth?
Judge Bauer answered these questions as follows:
59. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
60. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92-94 (1966), quoted in Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc., 475 U.S. 767, 781-82 (1986).
61. 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988).
62. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 827 F.2d 1119, 1143 n.13 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988).
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Brown & Williamson's attorney's fees were $1,360,000 prior to
post-trial motions. Jacobson's net worth including his contract with
CBS was over $5,000,000, while CBS's net worth was approximately
one and one-half billion dollars. The punitive damages award of
$50,000 against Jacobson is a modest one considering his net worth.
It might provide some deterrent value without being destructive. In
light of the attorney's fees that Brown & Williamson incurred and
CBS's substantial net worth, the $2,000,000 award against CBS is
reasonable. The award might provide some deterrence to future
misconduct and yet will not burden CBS with a debt that it cannot
easily discharge.63
Showing the total wealth of a company like CBS to be one and one-
half billion dollars clarifies the role of punitive damages in contemporary
libel law. An ordinary individual no less defamed than was Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation does not have the $1,360,000 paid by that
company in attorney's fees. Instead of pursuing the defamation action,
which abstractly is their right, such individuals simply cannot afford to
pursue their rights. Simply put, the availability of punitive damages may
make it economically feasible for there to be an occasional plaintiff's bar
in the libel field. The libel plaintiff who must cope with the ability of the
media defendant to use the discovery process as expensively as possible may
find in punitive damages a means of coping with the costs and attorney's
fees in libel litigation. The availability of punitive damages may enable a
lawyer to take a plaintiff's case on a contingency fee basis. Punitive damages
thus become a form of empowerment for those who believe themselves to
be both defamed and yet powerless to secure redress. The punitive damages
remedy provides an opportunity-momentary in most cases-for the indi-
vidual plaintiff to transform himself from David to Goliath.
63. Id. at 1143.
